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Jerry . O'Brie Inc. v. SEC: Does the Target of an
SEC Investigation Have the Right to Notice of
Third Party Subpoenas?
The competing interests of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) and the target of its investigation clash in cases where
the target either seeks additional information from the SEC or chal-
lenges the propriety of the SEC investigation itself. Recently, some
targets have asserted that they have the right to notice of SEC sub-
poenas issued to third parties in order to challenge the SEC investi-
gation and to protect privileged information.
In a recent decision,jeny TJ O'Bi'en, Inc. v. SEC,' the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the target of an SEC investi-
gation is entitled to notice when the SEC issues subpoenas to third
parties.2 Although the third party subpoena recipient can refuse to
comply with the subpoena and await judicial enforcement, the court
found that denying the target notice of the SEC subpoena precludes
the target from challenging the Commission's investigative
procedures.3
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, however, held in PepsiCo, Inc. v. SEC4 that the target is not
entitled to notice. While acknowledging the OTrien decision,5 the
New York court refused to follow it, determining that no constitu-
tional provisions, statutes, or cases granted the federal courts the
power to compel notice to an SEC target.6 "
The Supreme Court of the United States has granted the SEC's
1 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3509 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984) (No.
83-751). The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's denial of injunctive relief but re-
versed the denial of notice.
2 Id at 1069.
3 The Supreme Court outlined the threshold requirements for enforcing an administra-
tive subpoena in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). See note 25 infra and accompa-
nying text.
4 563 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
5 Id at 831. The PepsiCo court criticized the O'Brien opinion, noting that the Ninth
Circuit panel "seemed unconcerned with the implications of its rulings." The ruling would
permit targets to monitor the SEC investigations. Several targets might raise separate objec-
tions to each subpoena. Id at 832.
6 Id at 831.
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petition for certiorari in the O'Bn~'n case. 7 In Part I, this note dis-
cusses the general SEC investigative powers and procedures and the
specific investigations in O'Brien and PepsiCo. Part II focuses on the
litigants' competing concerns and the courts' varying analyses and
results. This note concludes that the O'Brien decision was incorrectly
decided and threatens to undermine the SEC's power to conduct ef-
fective and expedient investigations.
I. The Investigative Process
A. The SEC Subpoena
The Securities Act of 1933 and The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 provide the statutory authority governing the SEC's powers and
process of investigating potential securities laws violations. 8 The
SEC Rules of Practice and the Informal Procedures of the Commis-
sion incorporate the statutory authority and expand on how the SEC
implements the statutory powers.9 Under the Securities Act of 1933,
the Commission is authorized to conduct "all investigations which
.. .are necessary and proper for the enforcement" of the Act. 10
Under the Exchange Act, the SEC may make investigations to deter-
mine "whether any person has violated, is violating, or is about to
violate" any provisions of the Act."
Courts have recognized this broad statutory authority, holding
that administrative agencies generally have broad investigative pow-
ers, 1 2 possess and exercise the powers of original inquiry, and "can
investigate merely on the suspicion that the law is being violated, or
7 Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W.
3509 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984)(No.83-75 1).
8 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78u (1982).
9 For SEC Rules of Practice, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1-.28(1983); for Informal Procedures,
see 17 C.F.R. §§ 202.1-.8(1983).
10 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b) (1982). The statute empowers "any member of the Commission or
any officer or officers designated by it . . .to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena
witnesses, take evidence, and require the production of any books, papers, or other documents
which the Commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry."
11 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982). The section further states that
[t]he Commission is authorized in its discretion, to publish information concerning
any such violations, and to investigate any facts, conditions, practices, or matters
which it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of such provisions,
in the prescribing of rules and regulations under this chapter, or in securing infor-
mation to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation ....
12 For a compilation of the statutory authority for agency investigations, see Hannah v.
Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 454 (1960).
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even just because it wants assurance that it is not." 13 Similarly, the
SEC has broad authority to initiate an investigation of "possible,"
not necessarily "likely," securities laws violations.' 4
The SEC may commence an investigation based on complaints
from the public, information from government agencies,' 5 or exami-
nations of SEC filings.' 6 The investigation may lead to further SEC
measures. The Commission has the discretion to initiate administra-
tive proceedings seeking remedial measures, bring injunctive pro-
ceedings in court, or refer the case to the Justice Department for
criminal prosecution.' 7
An SEC staff member may request that the Commission issue a
Formal Order of Investigation (FOI). The staff member may not
issue the FOI independently, although some critics argue that the
Commission is a mere "rubber stamp" which defers to the staff mem-
ber's decision.' The FOI outlines the scope of the investigation and
authorizes officers to administer oaths, take depositions, and sub-
poena witnesses and documents.' 9
The rights of a subpoenaed party are limited. The witness may
be represented by counsel, but a witness may not receive a copy of
the FOI unless he obtains special approval.20 A party who appears
before the Commission does not necessarily know the identity of the
target of the investigation or the alleged securities laws violations.
13 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). In Morton Salt, the Court held
that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had the power to require the salt company to
produce records of price terms, evidencing compliance with a cease and desist order. Describ-
ing the FTC powers as more akin to those of a grand jury, the Court noted that a corporation
has no right to conduct matters in secret, nor the same right to enjoyment of the fourth
amendment as an individual. Id. at 642.
14 The SEC need not establish the likelihood of securities laws violations before adminis-
trative process will be judicially enforced. SEC v. Blackfoot Bituminous, Inc., 622 F.2d 512
(10th Cir.), cert. deniedsub noma. Drizin v. SEC, 449 U.S. 955 (1980); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch
Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
15 For a discussion of congressional members prompting investigations, see SEC v.
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1981).
16 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1983).
17 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1983). In SEC v. Dresser, 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 993 (1980), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the
SEC could provide the Justice Department the "fruits" of its civil discovery for use in a
criminal action. Id. at 1379.
18 See note 39 infla; SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 640 F.2d 118, 124 (3d Cir.
1981) (judicial enforcement of an agency subpoena should not be a "rubber stamp").
19 An "officer" conducting the investigation refers to the Commission, one or more of its
members, or any officer designated to take testimony of witnesses or evidence. 17 C.F.R.
§ 203.4(b) (1983); see note 10 supra.
20 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(a) (1983). The approval must be based on a consideration of the
privacy interests of those under investigation and the desire for an unimpeded investigation.
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The subpoena, which may be issued to the target of the investi-
gation or to a third party, need not be specific in scope,2 1 but the
Commission's rules do state that the subpoenas shall be no more
broad nor burdensome than necessary. 22 SEC subpoenas, like most
administrative subpoenas, are not self-enforcing. In order to enforce
a subpoena duces tecum or subpoena ad testifcandum, securities laws re-
quire the intervention of the judiciary.23 Despite the legend, "Fail
Not at Your Peril," inscribed on the subpoena, a party will not be
held in contempt until a federal court orders the enforcement of the
subpoena and the party fails to comply. Thus, federal courts do not
generally test the propriety of the investigation until the agency
brings a subpoena enforcement proceeding.
B. The Powell Standards: A High Standard for Quashing Subpoenas
Federal courts may limit, to some extent, the broad statutory
authority for conducting agency investigations under the standards
of United States v. Powell.24 In Powell, a taxpayer refused to comply
with an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) subpoena until the agency
made a showing that fraud had been committed. The Supreme
Court analyzed the IRS' statutory authority to conduct investiga-
tions, and in holding that an agency need not show probable cause
21 SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1978),cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071
(1979). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed an order requir-
ing the accounting firm to comply with an SEC subpoena. The court of appeals pointed to
administrative problems where a detailed subpoena would require the SEC to "grind opera-
tions to a halt." 584 F.2d at 1026.
22 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b) (1983).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1982) provides that:
In case of contumacy, or refusal to obey a subpena issued to, any person, the
Commission may invoke the aid of any court of the United States within the juris-
diction of which such investigation or proceeding is carried on, or where such person
resides or carries on business, in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, and other
records.
The SEC cannot enforce a subpoena absent judicial intervention. Penalties for noncompli-
ance include contempt, a fine of no more than $1,000, and/or imprisonment for no more than
one year. Id. See also United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); Reisman v. Caplin, 375
U.S. 440 (1964).
24 379 U.S. 48 (1964). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) brought enforcement pro-
ceedings under § 7604(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Court held that the IRS need
not show probable cause because "it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in carrying
out investigations he thinks warranted, forcing him to litigate and prosecute appeals on the
very subject he desires to investigate, and because the legislative history of§ 7605(b) indicates
no severe restriction was intended." Id at 54. The court also recognized the discretion given
to IRS employees who, like SEC staff members, make recommendations for formal investiga-
tions. Id at 57.
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before the subpoena will be enforced, the Court outlined the follow-
ing criteria that an agency must meet in a subpoena enforcement
proceeding: a) the investigation must be conducted pursuant to a
legitimate purpose; b) the inquiry must be relevant to that purpose;
c) the agency must not already possess the information; and d) the
administrative steps required by law must have been followed. 25
As far as the SEC is concerned, the Powell criteria are easily sat-
isfied. The SEC need only show that the subpoena is for the purpose
of investigating whether a party "may be violating a securities law,"
in order to satisfy the "legitimate purpose" standard.26 Further,
courts defer to the SEC, not to the opposing party, when determining
what is "relevant" to the investigation. 27 The Commission has little
incentive to require testimony or production of documents that it
already possesses. This third Powell criterion appears only to prevent
the SEC from imposing costly duplicative document production as a
method of harassing a target. The administrative procedures re-
quired before a court will enforce a subpoena are not burdensome. A
staff member recommends an investigation; the Commission issues
the FOI; and the subpoena is properly served. 28
A subpoenaed party must overcome significant barriers before a
court will deny enforcement of the SEC subpoena. The party has the
burden of showing noncompliance with Powell.2 9 Although the
Supreme Court has recognized that a party may challenge the sub-
25 Id at 57-58. Although Powell involved an IRS summons, courts have not limited these
criteria to the IRS. Indeed, much of the existing case law on administrative agency investiga-
tive processes draws few distinctions. In SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d
118, 123 n.5 (3d Cir. 1981), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted the similarities:
We assume, as do the parties, that the same standards are applicable to enforcement
of SEC subpoenas as Internal Revenue Service summonses. Thus, the subpoena
issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 78u, like the ad-
ministrative subpoena issued by the Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 49, and
the Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 U.S.C. § 20 6, as well as the administra-
tive summons issued under § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 7602, is
subject to the same judicial scrutiny prior to enforcement.
See also In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015 (1 1th Cir. 1983); ICC v. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
26 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (1983).
27 See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerl. denied,
439 U.S. 1071 (1979) (the subpoena was sufficiently limited in scope, and the test for rele-
vance was what the SEC deems relevant); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 52 U.S.L.W.
4355, 4358 (U.S. March 21, 1984). See alro note 10 supra.
28 17 C.F.R. §§ 202.5, 203.8 (1983).
29 379 U.S. at 58. The Court declared that it is the court's process which is invoked to
enforce the administrative summons, and a court may not permit its process to be abused.
The court stated that "[t]he burden of showing an abuse of the court's process is on the
taxpayer."
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poenas on the ground that the investigation is beyond the scope of
statutory authority, 30 case law illustrates that it is extremely difficult
for a party to overcome the presumption of administrative authority
and propriety. 31
Agencies are not required to show probable cause for issuing a
subpoena.3 2 The party asserting an "invalid purpose" carries a
heavy burden in attempting to prevent enforcement of a subpoena.33
The contesting party must show an improper purpose behind the
agency's investigation; alleging that an individual member of the
agency acted beyond the scope of authority will not suffice. 34 This
presents a considerable hurdle for the party refusing to comply with
a subpoena, especially in light of the fact that the SEC has the power
to investigate an entity in order to "rest assured" that no violation is
occurring.35
The Supreme Court has declared that administrative investiga-
tions are more akin to grand jury proceedings. 36 Thus, attempts to
thwart the enforcement of a subpoena on the grounds that the securi-
30 See, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1071 (1979), where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ob-
served that the judiciary has become less concerned about the threat of administrative agency
fishing expeditions; see also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); SEC v.
First Sec. Bank of Utah, 447 F.2d 166 (10th Cir. 1971),cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972); M.G.
Davis & Co. v. Cohen, 369 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1966).
31 See note 33 infta and accompanying text.
32 Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); see also SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d
1047 (2d Cir. 1973) (in a subpoena enforcement proceeding, probable cause is met where the
investigation is authorized by Congress for a valid purpose, and the documents sought are
relevant to that inquiry), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
33 United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316 (1978); see Sprecher v. Graber,
716 F.2d 968, 971 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting SEC v. Knopfler, 658 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1981) (a
subpoena enforcement proceeding is summary in nature; an evidentiary hearing is not re-
quired), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982)); United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d
36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978).
In Sprecher, the appellant claimed that the SEC violated an agreement that the SEC
would not issue a subpoena without first showing that the continued investigation was not for
the purpose of religious harassment. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared
that once "the SEC has complied with the statutory prerequisites . . . a meaningful and
factual showing must be made even to receive an evidentiary hearing." 716 F.2d at 971; see
also Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 692 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1982) (subpoena was neither
beyond the scope of the investigation nor too unlimited in time).
34 United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978); SEC v. Knopfler, 658 F.2d
25 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982); Holmes v. Eddy, 341 F.2d 477 (4th Cir.
1965); SEC v. O.K.C. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
35 See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(b), 78u(a) (1982).
36 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950). For an example of a
court refusing to affirm a subpoena enforcement, see SEC v. ESM Gov't Serv., Inc., 645 F.2d
310 (5th Cir. 1981).
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ties laws do not cover the alleged violation, a "cart before the horse"
argument, have not proved effective.3 7 Courts are not willing to ac-
cept, as arguments for quashing subpoenas, general allegations
against individual SEC staff members, assertions that more specific
information is needed, or claims that producing the requested docu-
ments is burdensome.38 Although critics have attacked the SEC's in-
vestigative procedures, focusing on the target's lack of power in the
early stages of an investigation,3 9 the trend among courts is not to
restrict the SEC power.
The Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of who may
challenge an agency investigation. In Reisman v. Capl/in,40 attorneys
for taxpayers sought to enjoin the IRS from issuing subpoenas in vio-
37 In SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1973), the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court that did not wish to order enforce-
ment of the subpoenas until a determination that the securities laws covered the activities in
question. The district court feared harm to the business and reputation of the firm. (The
court questioned whether dealings in whiskey constituted "securities.") The court of appeals,
in its decision to enforce the subpoena, stated:
We see no good reason to encumber the early stages of the Commission's inves-
tigation that each person from whom information is sought be advised of the nature
and status of the inquiry and the contentions of the parties. To do so would be
merely to invite controversy and litigation over the statement to be given. Further-
more, where an agency investigation is rapidly developing and changing, it would
be difficult, if not impossible, accurately and completely to summarize the current
status of the proceedings. Every person doing business and every investor knows
that government agencies conduct investigations for a variety of reasons, and most
of them feel the duty to respond to a proper inquiry. As for those whose practices
are investigated, it is a necessary hazard of doing business to be the subject of in-
quiry by a government regulatory agency. Thus we see no sound basis for imposing
on the Commission the requirement of reciting [that the SEC is conducting an in-
vestigation but has not made a determination that dealing in whiskey is a
"security."]
Id at 1056-57. The SEC regulations, similarly, reflect this lack of a notice requirement at the
early stages of the investigation. See 17 § C.F.R. 203.7 (1983); see also 17 C.F.R. § 203.5(c)
(1983) which provides that parties under investigation may submit a statement of "their in-
terests and position in regard to the subject matter of the investigation." The SEC staff is not
required to advise the party of the general nature of the investigation. Revealing the infor-
mation is discretionary. Id.
38 See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1071 (1979).
39 Lowenfels, Securities and Exchange Commission Investigations. The Need For Reform, 45 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 575 (1975). The commentator suggests that a more appropriate balance
could be achieved through independent supervision of investigations, more careful review of
staff members' recommendations for investigations, and more carefully worded orders of in-
vestigation. Id at 582; see also SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 640 F.2d 118 (3d Cir.
1981), in which the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit investigated the potential for
abuse where the decision to investigate arose from Sen. Lowell Weicker's complaint. But see 17
C.F.R. § 202.5 (1983).
40 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
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lation of work product rules. The Court denied equitable relief, stat-
ing that the legal remedy available to the interested parties was the
subpoena enforcement proceeding.41
Access to the subpoena enforcement proceeding, however, is not
absolute. In Donaldson v. United States,42 the Supreme Court noted
that federal courts have broad discretion in allowing intervention in
a subpoena enforcement proceeding. In Donaldson, the IRS requested
documents from the taxpayer's former employer and accountant and
the taxpayer subsequently attempted to intervene in the subpoena
enforcement proceeding. The Court held that the taxpayer (target)
had no proprietary interest in the subpoenaed documents.43
Thus, the Supreme Court has supplemented the statutory au-
thority of agency investigations with the following guidelines: When
an agency issues a subpoena either to a target or to a third party and
the target or party wishes to challenge the subpoena, he must do so in
an enforcement proceeding in federal court. An interested party,
usually the target, may intervene, but that intervention is permissive,
not mandatory.
In both O'Brien and PepsiCo, targets made significant challenges
to the SEC's investigative powers. The cases involved challenges not
only to the process of an investigation but also to the procedure by
which an interested party may assert those challenges.
C. The Investigations in O'Brien and PepsiCo-The Factual
Background
The O'Brien and PepsiCo cases provide insight into the investiga-
tive processes of the SEC and highlight the litigants' competing con-
cerns. Injery T O'Brien, Inc., two parties, O'Brien, Inc., a securities
broker-dealer, and Harry F. Magnuson & Co., the firm's accountant,
were targets of an SEC investigation. The targets refused to comply
with the subpoenas which the SEC issued, and they appealed from
the district court's order of enforcement. 4 The SEC, which had been
investigating Magnuson & Co. for roughly four and one half years,45
41 Id at 442-43. The Court did not address the lower courts' findings that the petitioners
lacked standing, that the papers were not the attorneys' work products, or that the papers
were protected by the attorney-client privilege.
42 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
43 Id at 529-30; see notes 78-82 infra and accompanying text.
44 Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W.
3509 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1984)(No. 83-75 1). Both Jerry T. O'Brien as an individual and Jerry T.
O'Brien, Inc., d/b/a Pennaluna & Co., sought to enjoin the SEC and appealed from the
denial of the injunction.
45 Brief for Appellant Magnuson & Co. at 8, 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983).
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alleged that the accounting firm violated antifraud and reporting
provisions of the federal securities laws.46 On September 30, 1980,
the SEC issued an FOI, triggering the subpoena power.47 Harry F.
Magnuson, of Magnuson & Co., claimed that the SEC did not notify
him of his status as a formal target until July 2, 1981.48 Jerry T.
O'Brien, of O'Brien, Inc., although not originally named as a target,
complied with subpoenas issued in the Magnuson & Co. investiga-
tion.49 After O'Brien learned that O'Brien, Inc. was also an SEC
target, the parties refused to comply with subpoenas. The SEC also
issued subpoenas to third parties. The targets then requested the
third parties not to comply.50
In September, 1981, the targets sought an injunction against the
SEC. The targets alleged that the SEC had failed to meet the Powell
standards in its investigation. 5' The litigants claimed that the SEC
misled O'Brien, by not naming him in the FOI, in order to induce
compliance with the subpoenas, that the SEC purposely released in-
vestigation information to newspapers, and that an SEC agent vio-
lated the targets' right to privacy.52 The district court granted the
SEC's motion to dismiss, finding that the targets had an adequate
remedy at law in a subpoena enforcement proceeding and that the
parties were not entitled to notice of SEC subpoenas issued to third
parties. 55 The stage was set for appeal to the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.
Similarly, in PepsiCo, the conflict between the corporation and
the SEC culminated not in a subpoena enforcement proceeding but
in a suit for equitable relief where the target requested notice of third
party subpoenas.54 The PepsiCo investigation differs from the O'Brien
46 704 F.2d at 1066. The alleged violations included insider trading and filing false or
misleading annual reports, proxy statements, and ownership statements. The FOI delineated
possible violations of the following securities laws: Sections 5(a),(c) and 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933; Sections 10(b), and 13(a),(d),(g), 14(a), and 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.
47 17 C.F.R. § 202.5 (1983).
48 Brief for Appellant Magnuson & Co. at 9, 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983).
49 704 F.2d at 1066.
50 Brief for Appellant O'Brien at 5, 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983).
51 704 F.2d at 1066.
52 Brief for Appellant O'Brien, app. B at 32-38. In their complaints, the appellants
claimed that Harrison, the sole shareholder of Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., found an "SEC agent-
attorney" in a storage closet at the Spokane Stock Exchange, Harrison's place of business.
The appellants alleged that he was surreptitiously going through personal files. Id at 35. Not
surprisingly, the SEC countered that the agent received permission to enter and only saw
public files. Brief for the Appellee SEC at 12, 13 n.19, 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983).
53 See 704 F.2d at 1065.
54 PepsiCo, Inc. v. SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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dispute in other respects.
In 1982, PepsiCo uncovered accounting irregularities. The In-
ternational Division of the corporation listed an overstatement of as-
sets and understatement of expenses which skewed the reports for the
entire corporation. 55 In addition to conducting an internal investiga-
tion, PepsiCo informed the SEC of these fraudulent acts.56 On Feb-
ruary 10, 1983, the SEC issued an FO157 and subpoenas to which
PepsiCo complied, supplying the SEC with "many thousands of
pages of documents."58 As the district court noted, PepsiCo cooper-
ated fully with the SEC.59 In an exchange of letters between PepsiCo
and the SEC, however, a conflict arose over PepsiCo's desire for no-
tice of third party subpoenas.60 The SEC denied the request and
distributed additional subpoenas to third parties, such as former em-
ployees and accountants. 61
PepsiCo sought equitable relief againt the SEC, alleging an in-
ability to ensure that the SEC conduct its investigation according to
the Powell standards and an inability to protect attorney-client privi-
leges and work products.6 2 PepsiCo requested "timely notice of the
person to whom the subpoena is directed, its return date and its con-
tents. 1 3 The district court dismissed PepsiCo's complaint, and Pep-
siCo did not appeal.6
II. United States v. Powell: The Test Applied to O'Brien and
PepsiCo
Not only did the investigations of PepsiCo and O'Brien differ,
but the two courts' interpretations of existing case law conflicted.
Ironically, the more cooperative target of the SEC investigation, Pep-
55 The fraudulent reports stemmed from operations in Mexico and the Philippines. After
internal investigations, the employees involved were dismissed.
56 563 F. Supp. at 829. The account overstated assets by more than $171.5 million. Op-
position of the SEC to PepsiCo's Application for a Temporary Restraining Order at 4 [herein-
after cited as SEC Memo]. PepsiCo also issued a press release disclosing corrected earnings.
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction at 3 [hereinafter cited as PepsiCo Memo].
57 SEC Memo, supra note 56, at 4. On February 14, 1983, the SEC delivered a copy of
the FOI and a subpoena to PepsiCo.
58 PepsiCo Memo, supra note 56, at 4.
59 563 F. Supp. at 829.
60 SEC Memo, supra note 56, at 7. In an exchange of letters, the SEC refused to comply
with PepsiCo's request for notice of subpoenas.
61 SEC Memo, supra note 56, at 7; Complaint at 4, PepsiCo.
62 Complaint at 4, PepsiCo.
63 Id at 1.
64 536 F. Supp. 828.
[19841
[Vol. 59:733]
siCo, was unable to extend Powell to require notice of third party
subpoenas where potential65 attorney-client privilege and work prod-
uct rules were involved.66
A. The O'Brien Analysis: The Ninth Circuit Deviates from Supreme
Court Precedent
The O'Brien court determined that two issues were presented on
appeal. First, what remedy is available when subpoenas are issued
directly to the target of an SEC investigation? Second, what rights
does the target have when a subpoena is issued to third parties?67
The court of appeals, affirming the district court's holding on the
first issue, determined that the target's legal remedy was to challenge
the SEC in a subpoena enforcement proceeding, where the target
could question whether the SEC complied with the Powell stan-
dards. 68 The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the court should not
enjoin the SEC is consistent with longstanding precedent. 69 Courts
are particularly wary of granting extraordinary equitable relief
where a legal remedy is available. 70
In addressing the collateral issue of notice of third party subpoe-
nas, however, the court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision
and found that the target needs knowledge of the subpoenas in order
65 The New York court noted that PepsiCo was only able to make a general claim of
potential violations and could not point to a specific circumstance of a violation. PepsiCo, the
court found, did not meet the irreparable harm requirement for equitable relief. PepsiCo
"failed to describe, for example, the type of privileged information that is likely to be dis-
closed, or to name former employees who might make improper disclosures." Id. at 830.
66 Id; see notes 94-98 infra and accompanying text.
67 Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d at 1066.
68 See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text. In Powell, the Supreme Court held that
the government need not make a
showing of probable cause to suspect fraud unless the taxpayer raises a substantial
question that judicial enforcement of the administrative summons would be an abu-
sive use of the court's process, predicated 6n more than the fact of re-examination
and the running of the statute of limitations on ordinary tax liability.
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 51.
The Court reached its conclusion by analyzing the IRS enforcement proceeding statutes
(Sections 7604(b), 7402(b), and 7605(b) of the I.R.C.) and their legislative history. The Court
interpreted § 7605(b): "[n]o taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary examinations or in-
vestigations . . .," as not requiring probable cause but only "requir[ing] some showing of
cause for suspecting fraud." The Court, significantly, declined to require a showing of prob-
able cause "because it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in carrying out investiga-
tions." 379 U.S. at 53-54. The Court did not wish to "overshoot" the legislature's intent by
overseeing an agency's decision to investigate. Id. at 56.
69 See Powell, 379 U.S. 48.
70 See, e.g., note 37 supra.
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to protect its rights under Powell.71 The Ninth Circuit determined
that the permissive right of a target, the party affected by disclosure,
to intervene and challenge the subpoenas in district court, when
combined with the target's right to be investigated in accordance
with Powell, entitled the target to notice of third party subpoenas.7 2
The court recognized the general rule was that parties do not have
the right to protect or withhold documents in the hands of a third
party, absent a privilege. 73 Yet, the court distinguished cases where
targets lacked standing to object to subpoenas issued to third parties,
finding that those cases centered on confidentiality as opposed to
rights under Powell.74
This analysis misinterprets the existing Supreme Court prece-
dent in Reisman v. Caplin,75 Powell ,76 and Donaldson v. United Stales.77
These cases do not provide that the target has a right to receive no-
tice of third party subpoenas, enter a district court, and allege a vio-
lation of the Powell standards. In O'Brien, the Ninth Circuit did not
properly distinguish between'the situations where a party has the
right to intervene in district court, the procedural issue, and where
the party has the right to be investigated according to the Powell
standards, the substantive issue. The O'Brien court instead merged
the procedural and the substantive rights, creating a new right to
notice of third party subpoenas.
In Reisman, the Supreme Court addressed the procedural right
to intervene in an IRS summons enforcement proceeding.78 There,
attorneys sought injunctive relief to protect allegedly privileged in-
formation. In holding that these interested parties had an adequate
remedy at law in the subpoena enforcement proceeding, the Court
held that the subpoenaed party may challenge the summons in dis-
trict court and that "third parties might intervene to protect their
interests. ' 79 The Court referred to specific "interests" warranting in-
tervention and a challenge to the summons: information protected
by the attorney-client privilege, improper use of material in a crimi-
71 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983).
72 Id. at 1067 (quoting Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964)). The Ninth Circuit
recognized that intervention in an enforcement proceeding is only permissive. Id. at 1068
(quoting Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 529-30 (1971)).
73 Id. at 1068 (quoting Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 523).
74 Id.
75 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
76 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
77 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
78 375 U.S. at 449.
79 Id. (emphasis added).
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nal prosecution,80 and work products.81 The Court noted that a
party could challenge a subpoena on "any appropriate ground," but
the Court, by specifically referring to the right to intervene where
privileged information is at issue, did not imply that a party has the
absolute right to intervene in a subpoena enforcement proceeding.82
Unlike the Ninth Circuit court in O'Brien, the Supreme Court distin-
guished between the grounds upon which a party may challenge a
subpoena and the circumstances where that challenge can be as-
serted. Under Reisman, the recipient of a subpoena may challenge
the subpoena and the interested party may intervene in the enforce-
ment proceeding in limited circumstances.8 3
Powell, similarly, neither explicitly nor implicitly extended a
third party's right to intervene in a subpoena enforcement proceed-
ing. The Court reiterated the right of the summoned party to chal-
lenge the subpoena on "any appropriate ground."84 Cognizant of
the third party subpoenas in Reisman85 and their use in agency inves-
tigations, the Powell Court did not expand a target's right to
intervene.
The effect of the Ninth Circuit court's decision is to impute the
rights of a subpoena recipient to an interested party, the target.
Under Reisman, the witness, not the target, has standing to challenge
the subpoena.86 By affirming the district court's ruling that the tar-
get's legal remedy is the subpoena enforcement proceeding, and by
holding that the target must be provided notice in order to challenge
compliance with Powell, the subpoena enforcement proceeding will
80 The Supreme Court, in Donaldson, noted that since Reisman was decided the circuit
courts uniformly approve the use of a summons in an investigation even if likely to lead to
criminal or civil liability. 400 U.S. at 532. The IRS, however, may only turn over the "fruits
of its civil discovery" to the Justice Department for tax violation criminal prosecutions. See 26
C.F.R. § 301.6103 (1983).
81 375 U.S. at 449.
82 The Reman Court held that "third parties might intervene to protect their interests, or
in the event the taxpayer is not a party to the sunimons before the hearing officer, he, too, may
intervene." Id. (emphasis added).
83 "[W]e hold that in any of these procedures before either the district judge or United
States Commissioner the witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate grounds."
Id. (emphasis added). In Application of Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950
(1965), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the IRS had no duty to give
advance notice to taxpayers or their counsel of the IRS' intention to examine bank records
and papers, stating, "the taxpayer under circumstances where only books, records and other
papers belonging to the third party are the subject of the summons, has no standing to object
to the summons." 342 F.2d at 8.
84 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964).
85 Id.
86 See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
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become a forum where the target has the right to intervene. Al-
though the Ninth Circuit court did not explicitly state that once the
target has notice of third party subpoenas, it has the absolute right to
intervene in a subpoena enforcement proceeding, that will be the ef-
fect of the O'Brien decision. In theory, the district court would retain
the discretion to determine whether to allow the target to intervene
in the actual enforcement proceeding. But, the target could petition
the court, alleging a violation of the Powell standards in its request to
intervene. The district court, in determining whether to allow inter-
vention, would have to examine whether the target presented a valid
challenge to the SEC investigation. The district court would be
forced to question compliance with Powell even before the actual sub-
poena enforcement proceeding. An unscrupulous target could at-
tempt to impede the SEC investigation in a two-step process, by
petitioning the court for intervention and by challenging the investi-
gation at the subpoena enforcement proceeding. A target could at-
tempt to intervene by challenging compliance with Powell in
conjunction with each subpoena that the SEC issues.
Notice would serve no purpose if these attempts to intervene
proved unsuccessful. If the federal court denied access to the enforce-
ment proceeding, the target may resort to coercing the third party
subpoena recipient into noncompliance, a result which the O'Brien
court, presumably, did not intend. The Ninth Circuit court created a
new procedural right, the right to intervene not just to protect privi-
leged information, but under any circumstances where the target
challenges the broadly stated substantive standards of Powell, stan-
dards which the SEC can easily meet.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated, however, that the district
court retains the discretion to allow intervention. In Donaldson v.
United States, decided after Reisman and Powell, the Court questioned
the right of a target-taxpayer to intervene in an IRS subpoena en-
forcement proceeding.87 The Court again noted the special circum-
stances of an attorney-client privilege and work product violation. 88
Although the case did not present the factual situation where the
target lacked constructive notice of the subpoena, the Court did not
demand that district courts permit intervention by the interested
87 In Donaldson, 400 U.S. 517 (1971), the taxpayer, whose former employer and its ac-
countant were subpoenaed, sought intervention under FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), alleging that
the subpoenas issued went beyond the scope of § 7602 of the I.R.C. The Court held that,
absent a privilege, the taxpayer had no proprietary interest in the records and no absolute
right to intervene. 400 U.S. at 529-30.
88 Id. at 532.
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party. "Reisman language . . . does not guarantee intervention for
the taxpayer [target]." 8 9 The Supreme Court, in Donaldson, did not
rule that an interested party, a target, has the wholesale rights of the
subpoena recipient, the right to challenge the subpoena on "any ap-
propriate grounds." Yet, the practical effect of the Ninth Circuit
court's decision in O'Bien is to give the target the wholesale rights of
the subpoenaed third party.
The Ninth Circuit's notice requirement in O'Bken goes far be-
yond any interpretation of Donaldson .90 The substantive right to be
investigated consistently with Powell and the procedural right to con-
test the subpoena on "any appropriate grounds" in the district court
merge only where the target is the subpoena recipient. Federal
courts do, however, specifically mention the right to intervene in a
subpoena enforcement proceeding where the attorney-client privi-
leges and work products are at stake,91 a claim which O'Brien did not
assert, but which did arise in PepsiCo. 92
B. PepsiCo: A More Compelling Argument for Notice
In PepsiCo, the attempt to enjoin the SEC from issuing subpoe-
nas without notice was based on the Powell-Relsman analysis similar
to the successful targets' attempt in O'Bien, as well as on the desire to
89 Id. at 529.
90 Some members of the Ninth Circuit court also felt that the O'Brien decision was con-
trary.to Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. In dissenting from a denial of a peti-
tion for rehearing en bane, Judge Kennedy stated that the decision went "beyond any
reasonable interpretation of Powell and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)."
In Miller, the Supreme Court held that the defendant, charged with various bootlegging
violations, had no fourth amendment right (no expectation of privacy) to suppress bank
records garnered through subpoenas. "[Tihis case is governed by the general rule that issu-
ance of a subpoena to a third party to obtain the records of that party does not violate the
rights of the defendant. .. ." 425 U.S. at 444.
Kelley v. United States, 536 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1047 (1977)
and Howfield, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1969) are also cases contrary to
O'Brien. In Kellf, the Ninth Circuit held that an IRS summons to a bank did not violate the
taxpayer's fourth amendment rights. In an action for the suppression of evidence brought
against the IRS, the Ninth Circuit court in Howftld affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
because an adequate remedy at law existed in the subpoena enforcement proceeding.
Despite the difference of opinion among the Ninth Circuit judges, the O'Bren precedent
was recently applied in Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc. v. SEC, 714 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1983),
where the court found that a securities brokerage firm had the right to receive notice of
subpoenas issued to third parties. The SEC contended that some of the third party witnesses
had requested nondisclosure and that disclosure of the witnesses would impair the effective-
ness of the investigation. The court of appeals denied the SEC's request for an emergency
stay of the district court injunction.
91 See notes 71-75 supra and accompanying text.
92 563 F. Supp 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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protect privileged information.93 PepsiCo also argued that the sum-
moned parties did not have standing to assert Powell requirements, 94
and that they may lack the resources or interest to assert the rights of
the target.95 PepsiCo feared that former employees and accountants,
for example, would divulge information that could result in the SEC
obtaining privileged information. 96 One of the New York court's
concerns was PepsiCo's failure to delineate concrete examples of
harm to the corporation. PepsiCo did not describe the type of infor-
mation or the employees who might disclose privileged informa-
tion.97 The court found that the complaint failed for ripeness.98
The PepsiCo court did not embrace the O'Bi'en decision nor did it
find PepsiCo's jurisdictional arguments persuasive. 99
In light of existing federal case law, PepsiCo's complaint, had it
overcome the ripeness issue, 100 presents a more legitimate claim for
notice of third party subpoenas than the circumstances in O'Brien.
Courts have recognized the problems associated with agencies whose
investigative powers threaten the attorney-client privilege or work
93 See PepsiCo Memo, supra note 56, at 7; Complaint at 4, PepsiCo. PepsiCo noted that
this was a case of first impression in the Second Circuit.
94 As the O'Brien court noted, a "Catch-22" situation arises where the target cannot chal-
lenge compliance with Powell standards if it is unaware of the investigation and the subpoena,
and the non-target lacks standing to contest the investigative process. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc.
v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 1983); see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
95 PepsiCo Memo, supra note 56, at 9-10.
96 The district court was particularly interested in this issue at the hearing for a tempo-
rary restraining order. Referring to Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the court
warned that the SEC would be "treading on thin ice" if they start asking questions of former
employees who were at the meetings with lawyers of PepsiCo, and privileged matters were
discussed. Hearing on PepsiCo's Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Prelim-
inary Injunction at 15 (May 31, 1983), PepsiCo Inc. v. SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) [hereinafter cited as PepsiCo Hearing]; see note 100 infira.
97 "The mere possibility of confidential disclosures does not satisfy the irreparable harm
requirement and hence justify a TRO." 563 F. Supp. at 831.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 830. The district court did not find that Section 27 of the Securities Exchange
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a(a) (1982), which provides for the district courts to hear
claims arising under the securities laws, provided jurisdiction for targets to bring suit against
the SEC asking for injunctive relief. But see note 23 supra. The court indicated that the
federal due process nature of Powell and the attorney-client privilege may confer jurisdiction.
See also PepsiCo Hearing, supra note 96, at 31.
The court clearly did not agree with the O'Brien decision. "The Ninth Circuit in its rush
to dispose of cases may well have. . . read a brief without reading the case. I don't see how
they read United States v. Powell in the way they did." Id. at 4.
100 The "case or controversy" requirement was not met. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gard-
ner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), where the Supreme Court expressed reluctance to grant injunctive
or declaratory relief unless they arise in the context of a ripe controversy. The ripeness doc-
trine avoids premature entanglement by courts in agency decisions.
[1984]
[Vol. 59:733]
product rules. An agency may not gather this information.10' Yet,
protecting the privilege presents procedural difficulties. Although an
employee may not waive the privilege of the corporation, 10 2 a busi-
ness entity, unaware that an employee possesses privileged informa-
tion, may lack the ability to assert protective rights. As PepsiCo
illustrates, an imprecise assertion of the privilege may not meet the
"case or controversy" and "irreparable harm" requirements for an
injunction. 10 3 Procedurally, how can these rights be asserted when
courts disfavor resorting to judicial intervention before the subpoena
enforcement proceeding?1 0 4
The PepsiCo court suggested that the target supply the SEC with
a list of former employees who might possess privileged informa-
tion.105 PepsiCo, however, argued that such a measure would be
burdensome. 10 6 It may also be incomplete, particularly where a
large corporation is involved or where the alleged fraudulent acts oc-
curred far in the past. Nevertheless, the New York district court de-
termined that PepsiCo would have the opportunity to vindicate its
rights if a breach occurred. 107
PepsiCo presents a situation where the corporation is aware of its
status as a target, is aware of the nature of the SEC investigation,
101 See, e.g., Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (an IRS summons is subject to
"traditional privileges and limitations," such as the attorney-client privilege and work prod-
uct rules); see also United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 52 U.S.L.W. at 4359.
102 See In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury, 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury
Proceeding, 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478
F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979). But see Teachers Ins. Annuity Assoc. v. Shamrock, 521 F.
Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), where the court declared that the transfer of documents to the
SEC without the invocation of an attorney-client privilege constituted a waiver.
103 PepsiCo, Inc. v. SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
104 See Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980).
105 563 F. Supp. at 831. The court encouraged the litigants to work out some arrange-
ment where the privileged information would not be disclosed. The SEC stated that the use
of lists of employees and dates of conversations would protect the information. The court
thought such an accommodation would be valuable. Defining the parameters of a discussion
would not be effective except to arouse curiosity. PepsiCo Hearing, supra note 95, at 30-32.
106 PepsiCo Hearing, supra note 96, at 36.
107 563 F. Supp. at 831. The court, recognizing that a third party cannot waive the attor-
ney-client or work product privilege, noted that:
[W]hile this circumstance would tend to justify permitting PepsiCo to intervene in a
subpoena enforcement proceeding, or to appeal a decision enforcing a subpoena for
such information, it also tends to establish that the company will be able to vindi-
cate its rights if a privilege is violated. The remedies appropriate for such a viola-
tion will no doubt depend upon the surrounding circumstances, and might well
include sanctions designed to deter improper inquiries conducted without no-
tice. . . . The SEC will be unable to claim later, if a breach of privilege occurs,
that the agency was unaware that its third party subpoenas might cause a violation
of PepsiCo's rights.
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and is aware, to a certain degree, of who may possess privileged infor-
mation. The more troublesome situation arises where an entity is not
yet named as a formal target, and the alleged securities violations are
not yet known. The suggestion that the party being investigated and
the SEC work out some method of accommodating both parties' in-
terests will only be truly effective if the party is aware of the sub-
poena;- the target can then warn the SEC that it is encroaching on
privileged information. If no accommodation is reached, the courts
must determine what remedy is available if privileged information is
disclosed. For example, is a Wong Sun suppression of information de-
rived from the breach of the privilege to be applied? 08
The PepsiCo court's solution demands an assumption that the
SEC will act in good faith'0 9 and that the interested party is aware of
its status as a target, in order to assert its rights."10 Conceivably, a
breach of an attorney-client privilege could occur before the entity is
declared a formal target. The SEC, in the course of a formal investi-
gation of one corporation, could acquire privileged information of a
corporation not yet named as a target. The SEC stated that once the
agency is aware that the information falls within the parameters of
privileged information, questioning ceases."' Obviously, this re-
quires good faith. If reliance on SEC good faith does not suffice, the
target, if it has acquired that status, needs notice.
C. The SEC Argument: The Need for Investigative Expedienqy
Despite PepsiCo's argument for the need to protect privileged
information, public policy may outweigh the target's desire for notice
of all third party subpoenas. Federal courts have recognized the
need to avoid judicial intervention in the investigative process of an
administrative agency whose authority derives from congressional
mandate.112 Although Powell is an example of the judiciary's power
to serve as "check" on the agency's investigative power and tactics,
108 SEC Memo, supra note 56, at 34 n.37. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).
109 The SEC also admitted that preventing the intrusion into the attorney-client privilege
area demands a good faith assumption. If, for example, the SEC receives protected informa-
tion, the SEC policy is simply "not to use it." PepsiCo Hearing, supra note 96, at 27.
110 Only the "target" can assert that the investigation did not meet Powell standards. See
note 93 supra.
111 PepsiCo Hearing, supra note 96, at 20-24.
112 See PepsiCo v. SEC, 563 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); SEC v. Blackfoot Bituminous,
Inc., 622 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047 (2d
Cir. 1973),cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974). But see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 453
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the SEC must have the ability to carry out investigations without
unnecessary delay. As the PepsiCo court noted, courts should be wary
of hampering federal agencies in the performance of their duties; ex-
cessive delay and abuse could result where several targets raise objec-
tion to each subpoena an agency serves.11 3 The SEC also argued that
a notice requirement would afford a target the opportunity to harass
prospective witnesses as well as invade the privacy interests of those
wishing to help the government.11 4 Voluntary cooperation would
cease.
The O'Brien decision also opens up additional, unresolved ques-
tions of law. If a "target" must be provided notice of third party
subpoenas, at what point does a person or entity become a target?"15
The O'Brien decision may cause the SEC to delay issuing an FOI and
naming a "potential" target if "target" status triggers the notice re-
quirement. In dragnet investigations where numerous potential
targets exist and where information may be available from a variety
of sources, the SEC will have incentive to delay naming a target until
the eleventh hour.
The SEC pointed to other issues which the courts would ulti-
mately need to resolve." 6 Is retrospective notice of subpoenas re-
quired? What form of notice? How far in advance must the SEC
issue notice? What form of relief should be available? Although the
potential for opening up unresolved areas of law is not a meritorious
argument standing alone, it exhibits the ramifications of the Ninth
Circuit O'Brien decision. The basic concern is the resolution of the
tension between the target's rights and the harmful entanglement in
agency investigations. The target should not be provided the oppor-
tunity to bring SEC investigations to a halt by challenging each sub-
poena which the SEC issues. Yet, some protection is necessary to
protect privileged information.
III. Conclusion
Neither statutes nor case law support the O'Brien decision. Con-
gress intended to grant the SEC broad powers of investigation,'' 7 in-
113 563 F. Supp. at 832. The court pointed out that no evidence suggested that PepsiCo, a
cooperative target, would use notice for any purpose of abuse. But "notice will provide the
unscrupulous individuals with an ideal tool to obstruct justice." SEC Memo, supra note 56, at
29.
114 SEC Memo, supra note 56, at 31.
115 See id. at 32-34.
116 Id.
117 See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text. Courts have underlined this broad stat-
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cluding the power to enter the federal district court to enforce a
subpoena." 18 Courts interpret the SEC's investigative power broadly,
and although Powell provides an opportunity to challenge the inves-
tigative process, the four-part test of Powell can be easily satisfied.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Supreme Court cases cre-
ates a previously unrecognized right of a target to receive notice of a
third party subpoena, enter a district court to prevent its enforce-
ment by alleging noncompliance with the general Powell standards,
and delay the SEC investigation. The effect of the O'Brien decision is
to abolish the district court's discretion in assessing whether an inter-
ested party may intervene. At the preliminary stage of an investiga-
tion, a target corporation, a creature of statute, should not be entitled
to rights enjoyed by an individual in a criminal proceeding. The
investigation is more akin to a grand jury proceeding.' 19
A notice requirement will do little to prevent SEC abuse of its
investigative powers. The availability of a legal remedy in the sub-
poena enforcement proceeding provides no remedy for a target or a
recipient of a subpoena, other than noncompliance, where the SEC
chooses not to bring an enforcement proceeding in federal court.
The agency, if it anticipated an inability to meet the Powell require-
ments, could simply refrain from bringing an action, avoiding the
scrutiny of the intervening judiciary. Of course, the ability to garner
information where the agency cannot meet the Powell standards
would only be fruitful where the subpoena recipient is- unaware of his
rights or disinterested in the investigation. Theoretically, the SEC
could issue subpoenas, await the recipient's response, evaluate com-
pliance with Powell, and choose whether or not to seek enforcement.
In reality, however, courts presume that the SEC acts in good faith.
PepsiCo presents the more persuasive argument for notice of
third party subpoenas. Courts, however, should not encourage agen-
cies to make distinctions, involving a target's rights, on the basis of
utory authority. See SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1981);
SEC v. Murray Director Affiliates, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Howatt,
525 F.2d 226 (1st Cir. 1975); SEC v. Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v.
Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974);
W.J. Abbott & Co. v. SEC, 276 F. Supp. 502 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
118 15 U.S.C. § 77u (1982).
119 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 1632 (1950); see also United States v. Don-
aldson, 400 U.S. 517, 537 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring), where the Justice found that the
party has "no right to be free from incrimination by the records or testimony of others."
The secrecy of grand jury proceedings is a long-established policy designed, in part, to
prevent the forewarning of an investigation. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,
441 U.S. 221 (1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958).
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the target's cooperativeness. Notice of third party subpoenas, if pro-
vided at all, should not be furnished at the whim of the SEC. Had
PepsiCo been able to delineate specific examples of potential attor-
ney-client privilege situations, the Reisman -Powell analysis might have
proved persuasive. Yet, this analysis fails to distingush between the
substantive rights under Powell and the procedural rights under Reis-
man and Donaldson.
Courts should not open the door to thwarting SEC investiga-
tions by requiring notice of third party subpoenas in all situations
where an attorney-client privilege may be at stake. The remedy
should center on preventing use of the material, not requiring the
SEC to provide notice of all subpoenas. As PepsiCo illustrates in the
attorney-client privilege realm, a presumption that the SEC acts in
good faith should exist. The broad statutory authority and the diffi-
culty in proving that an investigation does not meet the Powell stan-
dards exhibit a legislative intent to presume SEC good faith.
Congress and courts have imposed few restraints on the agency.
Internal SEC Rules of Practice could serve the interests of a tar-
get without resulting in the target's ability to thwart an SEC investi-
gation if a target received notice of third party subpoena. For
example, in a case such as PepsiCo, where the target is aware of the
SEC investigation, the SEC should be required to allow the corpora-
tion to submit lists of persons who may possess privileged informa-
tion. If the target finds through discovery proceedings that the SEC
reaped any privileged information, the target should then be able to
enter federal court to enjoin the SEC from using the information or
any material derived from it. Such an accommodation would then
not become a sword to thwart SEC investigations. Moreover, the
ramifications of the O'Brien decision are not limited to SEC investiga-
tions. Considering the broad statutory authority that other agencies
possess, and agencies' use of third party subpoenas, the O'Brien deci-
sion would hamper numerous executive branch investigations. 120
Simply stated, the O'Brien decision is ungrounded in existing statu-
tory and case law and controverts public policy.
Molly B. Murphy
120 See notes 12 and 25 supra; Powell v. United States, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964), where the
court examined various agencies' investigative powers.
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